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Loop free construction of counter models
for intuitionistic propositional logic
Luis Pinto and Roy Dyckho 
Abstract  We present a non looping method to construct Kripke trees refuting the non 
theorems of intuitionistic propositional logic using a contraction free sequent calculus
 Mathematics Subject Classication B	 B
 C	
 F 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  Introduction
It is well known that IPL  Intuitionistic Propositional Logic has the nite model
property in fact any nontheorem of IPL can be invalidated by means of a nite
Kripke tree 	 The standard method  see 
 for a formal treatment for construct
ing such countermodels requires a loopchecker	 Here we present a method for con
structing countermodels not requiring a loopchecker based on the contraction
free sequent calculi LJT and LJT  	
LJT provides a very simple but reasonably eective decision procedure for IPL	
The ideas were rst presented in the work of Vorobev  and more recently also
in  and 	 LJT diers from traditional formulations of Gentzen sequent calculi
for IPL only in the rule   for introduction of implication on the left and in not
having a contraction rule as primitive	 Traditionally during the proofsearch in
going from the conclusion of   to its major premiss we have to duplicate the
principal formula raising the problem of nontermination	 In LJT the rule  
is replaced by four other rules the calculus is then terminating in the sense that
every increasing sequence of partial proofs terminates	
LJT  is a Bethstyle  multisuccedent variant of LJT also shown in  to
have the same termination property	 It is not immediately obvious that it can be
used eectively to build countermodels our purpose in this paper is to show that
it can	 For expository reasons we use LJT  to dene a calculus CRIP  Calculus
for Refutation of Intuitionistic Propositions that captures unprovability for IPL	
We show that each sequent is either a theorem of LJT  or a theorem of CRIP	
We show that CRIP is also terminating and we show how for each theorem of
CRIP to construct a nite Kripke tree witnessing the theoremhood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 The calculus LJT
Atoms are denoted p q 				 Propositional formulae A B   are built up as usual
using symbols for conjunction disjunction and implication	 We denote absurdity
by f and use it to dene negation by A
def
 A   f 	 Sequents have the form  
where the antecedent  and the succedent  are multisets of formulae	 LJT  has
no  primitive structural rules	 The logical rules are standard with the exception
of the rule   for introduction of implication on the left	 This rule is divided into
four cases as in gure 	  The exceptional rules for LJT are those obtained from
those in gure  by allowing just a single formula in the succedent	 Notice that
the left premiss of  
 
 
contains only one formula in the succedent	 All the rules
in LJT  apart from 
 
 introduction of implication on the right and  
 
 
are
invertible	 LJT  formalises intuitionistic provability for sequents  gives details
of its correctness and completeness	
  p  B  
  p  p   B  
 
 

  C   B D   B  
   C D   B  
 
 

  C    D   B 
   C D   B  
 
 

D   B C  D B  
 C   D   B  
 
 
 
Figure  The LJT  rules for introduction of implication on the left	
Denition  An implication A   B is an atomic implication  with atom A if A
is atomic it is a nested implication if A has the form C   D	
Denition  A sequent    is irreducible if  i its antecedent  contains
only atomic implications nested implications and atomic formulae and none of
the atoms of the atomic implications are equal to any of the atomic formulae
 ii its succedent  contains only implications and atomic formulae	    is
strongly irreducible if it is irreducible and contains neither nested implications in
the antecedent  nor implications in the succedent 	
Lemma  A strongly irreducible sequent   is provable in LJT  i it is an
axiom of LJT  ie   and  have a formula in common
Proof Trivial	 ut
 The calculus CRIP
An antisequent is a pair    of multisets of formulae represented as   	
Figure  presents the calculus CRIP formalising refutability of sequents of IPL
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as provability  of the corresponding antisequent in CRIP	 We call the formal
structures built up according to the rules of CRIP refutations	
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The provisos in rules axiom and   are
 
 and  contain only atomic formulae and are disjoint	 Every p
i
is atomic and
not in 	  does not contain f	

Every formula in  is either atomic or an atomic implication and none of the
antecedents of the atomic implications are equal to any of the atomic formulae	
 contains only atomic formulae	  and  are disjoint	
Figure  The calculus CRIP	
Lemma  The wellfounded ordering on antisequents given in  is such that
for each rule of CRIP each of the premises is smaller than the conclusion
Proof By inspection as in 	 Note that the ordering is just the DershowitzManna
multiset ordering induced by an obvious wellfounded ordering on formulae	 ut
Corollary  CRIP is terminating
Proof Trivial	 ut
Theorem  For every pair    of multisets of formulae  either 
LJT 
 
or 
CRIP
    but not both
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Proof Consider two multisets   of formulae	 We show by induction  using
the multiset ordering on the multiset union    that either 
LJT 
   or

CRIP
  	 There are several cases
	 If   is strongly irreducible then either it is an axiom of LJT  by virtue
of an atom occurring in   or it is an axiom of CRIP in each case the
conclusion follows	
	 Suppose   A B 

	 By the induction hypothesis one of four cases holds
a 
LJT 
  A 

and 
LJT 
  B 

and then applying the rule for
introduction of conjunction on the right we get 
LJT 
 A B 

	
b 
LJT 
  A 

and 
CRIP
  B 

and then by applying rule  we
obtain 
CRIP
  A B 

	
c 
CRIP
  A 

and 
LJT 
  B 

and then by applying rule  we
obtain 
CRIP
  A B 

	
d 
CRIP
  A 

and 
CRIP
  B 

 we can then use either rule  or
rule  to obtain 
CRIP
  A B 

	
	 The cases dealing with disjunctions in  or with conjunctions disjunctions or
implications whose antecedents are either conjunctions disjunctions or atomic
formulae in  all follow by the same kind of argument they all correspond to
invertible rules in LJT 	
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 
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  	 If for some 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
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CRIP
  	 Otherwise
by induction for all 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then using  
 
 
we have 
LJT 
  and if not applying rule  we obtain

CRIP
  	
Thus we have shown that for any pair    either 
LJT 
  or 
CRIP
  	
Also it is routine to show by induction  on the size of the LJT  proof that only
one of these two can hold	 ut
 Construction of countermodels
We assume familiarity with Kripke semantics   	 In brief we are interested in
nite Kripke trees i	e	 sets K with a reexive transitive binary relation 
 on K
with a least elementw

such thatKnw

is a disjoint union of Kripke trees together
with a monotone relation j from K to the set of atoms of IPL extendable in
Loop free construction of counter models 
a standard way to a forcing relation j between K and the formulae of IPL	
Elements of K are called its worlds w

is called the initial world	
Denition  A Kripke tree is a countermodel to a sequent    if it has a
world in which all the formulae in  are forced and none of the formulae in  are
forced	
Denition  A Kripke tree is a strong countermodel to a sequent   if in
its initial world all the formulae in  are forced and none of the formulae in  are
forced	
Every strong countermodel is a countermodel but not conversely	 The method
described below for constructing countermodels for the nontheorems of IPL in
fact constructs strong countermodels	
The construction of countermodels is closely related to the notion of invertib
ility	 For an invertible rule the conclusion is provable i the premises are provable
for a countermodel to the conclusion is the same as a countermodel to one of
the premises	 Noninvertible rules introduce choice points in the proofsearch this
corresponds to branching in the countermodel	 The base case is where none of the
rules can be applied	 In this case we proceed classically forcing everything in the
antecedent and none of the things in the succedent	 We formalize this construction
in lemma  and proposition 	
For expository reasons in what follows we will be talking about countermodels
 strong countermodels to antisequents	 A countermodel  strong countermodel
to a sequent   is the same as the countermodel  strong countermodel our
method constructs to   	
Lemma  For any world w in a Kripke tree K  if A   B is a theorem of IPL
and if w j A then w j B
Proof Follows from denition	 ut
Corollary  For any world w in a Kripke tree  if A and B are provably equivalent
formulae of IPL then w j A i w j B
Proof Trivial	 ut
Lemma  Let p

  B

    p
n
  B
n
     where  contains only atoms  be
an axiom of CRIP Then the tree K consisting only of the single world w forcing
the atoms in  is a strong countermodel to the axiom
Proof Trivial	 ut
Proposition  For every rule of CRIP  if there is a strong countermodel for
each of the premises then there is a strong countermodel for its conclusion
Proof For the rules 			 a strong countermodel to the conclusion of the rule
is the same as a strong countermodel to its premiss es	 We prove that this holds
for rule 
 all the other cases are easily proved in the same way	 Let us assume
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that K with initial world w is a strong countermodel to   C    D   B  	
We have to prove that K is also a strong countermodel to    C D   B  	
To do so it is enough to prove that w j  C D   B this follows by corollary 
because C    D   B is equivalent to  C D   B	
For rule  suppose we have strong countermodels K

   K
n
 K


   K

m
to the
n  m premises	 A strong countermodel K to the conclusion is a Kripke tree
with initial world w forcing all the atoms in  and with n m children given by
K

   K
n
 K


   K

m
	 It is easy to prove that this construction yields a Kripke tree
	 To show that K is a strong countermodel we have to prove that w forces all of
the formulae in the antecedent and none of the formulae in the succedent	 Recall
that  contains only atomic formulae which are forced in w by construction and
atomic implications which are forced in w because none of their antecedents can
be forced otherwise the antisequent would have been reducible	 By hypothesis
all the initial worlds of the Kripke trees K

   K
n
 K


   K

m
force these atomic
implications	 Now we prove that for all i   
 i 
 m w j  C
i
  D
i
   B
i
	
We know that w j C
i
  D
i
because in the initial world of K
i
 C
i
is forced and
D
i
is not forced	 We still have to prove  C
i
  D
i
   B
i
is forced at each of the
K
j
  
 j 
 n  m	 By hypothesis  C
i
  D
i
   B
i
is certainly forced in all the
K
j
except K
i
	 Because C   D   B implies  C   D   B applying lemma  we
easily prove that K
i
also forces  C
i
  D
i
   B
i
	 We still have to prove that none
of the formulae in the succedent are forced in w	 The atomic formulae cannot be
forced since they are all distinct from the atomic formulae forced in w	 None of
the formulae E
i
  F
i
can be forced in w because in the initial world of K

i
 E
i
is
forced but F
i
is not forced	 ut
Example  We apply the method described above to construct a strong counter
model to   p   q   p   p  Peirces formula	 Figure  presents a refutation in
CRIP of the antisequent for Peirces formula	
q   p  p  q
 p   q   p  p
   p   q   p   p
Figure  CRIP refutation of Peirces formula	
Applying proposition  and the observation that 
LJT 
  A   B i 
LJT 
  A B  i	e	 for this particular case the rule 
 
for introduction of implication
on the right is invertible and so a countermodel to the conclusion is the same as a
countermodel to the premiss we see that the following Kripke tree witnesses the
refutability of Peirces formula	 The tree has two worlds w

and w

 with w


 w

	
In w

nothing is forced and in w

p is forced	 It is easy to check that w

does not
force   p   q   p   p	
In gure  we illustrate how Peirces formula could be refuted using a method
with loopchecking	 The Kripke tree we obtain using this method is the same as
the one obtained before	
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looping
 p   q   p  p   q
p  p  q
 p   q   p  p  q
 p   q   p  p   q  p
 p   q   p  p
Figure  Refutation of Peirces formula with looping	
 Relatedwork
Tiomkin  gives a method to construct countermodels for the nontheorems in
classical logic	 Unlike in IPL all the rules for classical propositional logic are
invertible this trivialises the construction of countermodels	
Underwood 
 presents a constructive proof of completeness of nite Kripke
trees for IPL the proof is formalized in Nuprl which allows an algorithm to be
extracted mechanically from the proof	 This algorithm produces for each formula
either a proof in the form of an inhabitant of the corresponding type or a nite
Kripke tree and a world therein such that the formula is not forced in that world	
The termination of this algorithm is proved by induction on the number of formulae
and sequents that can be added to the system without generating repetitions
eectively the implementation depends on a loopchecker	
Miglioli et al  exploit the calculi presented in  to give an improved proof
procedure for intuitionistic predicate logic although described as a refutation sys
tem there is no explicit refutation calculus in the sense given by CRIP and the
exposition of the method of building Kripke interpretations is complicated by the
need to handle rst order formulae	  There are interesting applications to Kuroda
logic	
Remark  We regard Kripke trees as having the same relation to refutation
trees in CRIP as lambdaterms have to sequent calculus or natural deduction
proofs they contain information from which one can readily observe the existence
of a refutation  resp	 proof only by some fairly nontrivial steps	
 Conclusion
In principle everyone knows how to build Kripke trees but in practice the tech
nique involves loopchecking	 We have shown how to build Kripke trees witnessing
the nonprovability  in IPL of propositional formulae by a method which involves
no loopchecking	
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